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Aggravated Sentencing: 
Blakely v. Washington
Practical Implications for 
State Sentencing Systems
Jon Wool and Don Stemen
At the close of its 2003-2004 term, the United States 
Supreme Court roiled many states’ criminal justice systems 
when it struck down Washington’s sentencing guidelines 
scheme. 
In Blakely v. Washington the Court ruled that a judge 
may not increase a defendant’s penalty beyond that which 
would be available “solely on the basis of the facts reflected in 
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”1 Put another 
way, under Blakely, when the law establishes an effective 
maximum sentence for an offense, the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to trial by jury prohibits a judge from imposing a 
longer sentence if it is based on a fact—other than prior 
conviction—determined by the judge. Any such fact must be 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt if not admitted by 
the defendant. 
The ruling, which invalidated the provisions of 
Washington’s guidelines system that allow a judge to 
make factual findings and then impose a penalty beyond 
a recommended standard range of sentences, has wide 
implications. In her dissent, Justice O’Connor identified nine 
other states whose sentencing regimes are cast into doubt 
under Blakely. Our analysis suggests that there may be many 
more.2
Five states—Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, 
and Tennessee—employ presumptive sentencing guidelines 
systems that enable judges to enhance sentences by finding 
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This is the inaugural issue of a new series that will focus on the 
Supreme Court’s powerful, yet profoundly disrupting, decision in 
Blakely v. Washington. Over the next six months, we will seek to 
provide timely and helpful analysis of Blakely’s reach, offer practical 
advice to state lawmakers needing to realign their systems, and 
report on state reactions to the ruling. In sum, we hope to help 
decision makers find appropriate answers (many of which already 
exist and some of which are working in practice)—and perhaps 
even the opportunity for positive change—amid the uncertainty and 
apprehension that the Court has caused. 
In this first report, we look to answer two big questions: Which 
states’ sentencing systems are affected by Blakely? and What 
responses are available to legislators and other policymakers? The 
first section assesses states according to the characteristics of their 
sentencing systems and their susceptibility to Blakely. The second 
section examines possible solutions, including the use of jury fact-
finding for states seeking to retain enhanced penalties and how 
voluntary guidelines systems may be inoculated against Blakely ills 
by changing the ways in which judges use or report deviations from 
their guidelines.
The next publication in the series, the companion piece Legal 
Considerations for State Sentencing Systems, will provide a more 
detailed examination of the legal issues raised in Blakely and prior 
decisions of the Court and discusses the implications for sentencing 
provisions apart from those in structured sentencing regimes. 
Publications are only part of Vera’s Blakely response. We are helping 
state officials manage the implications of the ruling, both through 
onsite work in capitals and by bringing state leaders together 
to learn from national experts and each other about promising 
responses. To learn more about Vera’s state work, please contact 
me at (212) 376-3073, dwilhelm@vera.org, or visit Vera’s website at 
www.vera.org/ssc.
Daniel F. Wilhelm
Director, State Sentencing and Corrections Program
aggravating facts, as does the Washington system addressed 
by the Court. At least eight additional non-guidelines states—
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, and Ohio—employ functionally equivalent 
presumptive sentencing systems. The systems in this core 
group of 13 states appear to be fundamentally affected by the 
Blakely decision.3 
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The fallout may also envelop six other states—Arkansas, 
Delaware, Maryland, Rhode Island,4 Utah, and Virginia—
employing voluntary sentencing guidelines systems that 
nonetheless require a court to apply a suggested sentence 
range and provide justification for any sentence above that 
recommended by the range. Depending on how future 
court decisions define the scope of Blakely, it is also possible 
that two indeterminate sentencing states—Michigan 
and Pennsylvania—that employ presumptive sentencing 
guidelines systems may run afoul of the ruling. Finally, 
Blakely has implications for other state sentencing provisions 
beyond these 21 with structured sentencing systems.5 Every 
statute that provides for an enhanced penalty beyond that 
authorized solely by the jury’s verdict must be examined to 
determine whether it is based on facts—other than prior 
conviction—determined by a judge. Such statutes include 
those that allow additional punishment upon a judge’s 
finding that the defendant was on parole at the time of the 
offense, that the crime was committed for compensation, 
or that the victim was of a certain age. We will discuss these 
implications in a companion report, Legal Considerations for 
State Sentencing Systems. 
Although Justice O’Connor may have understated 
the number of states affected by the Court’s ruling, the 
situation may not be as dire as her conclusion that “[o]ver 
20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost.”6 It is true 
that affected states will have to amend their sentencing 
structures in large or small ways. But that reality is tempered 
by the fact that in many states, unlike the federal system, 
judicial fact-finding is used in only a small fraction of cases 
and thus is easier to avoid while states are constructing 
responses. Moreover, there are ways to cure Blakely ills, 
and examples exist of constitutionally-sound solutions 
that largely preserve the goals that drove states to enact 
Glossary
The following definitions reflect their most common usage and 
their usage in this report.
 
Structured sentencing system: a system providing some form of 
recommended sentences within statutory sentence ranges.
Sentencing guidelines system: procedures to guide sentencing 
decisions and a system of multiple, recommended sentences 
based generally on a calculation of the severity of the offense 
committed and the criminal history of the offender.  
Presumptive sentencing guidelines: sentencing guidelines that 
require a judge to impose the recommended (presumptive) 
sentence or one within a recommended range, or provide 
justification for imposing a different sentence.
Voluntary sentencing guidelines: sentencing guidelines that do 
not require a judge to impose a recommended sentence, but 
may require the judge to provide justification for imposing a 
different sentence.
Presumptive sentencing: a system of recommended 
(presumptive) sentences, based solely on the offense or offense 
class, that a judge must impose or provide justification for 
imposing a different sentence. 
Effective maximum sentence: the maximum sentence 
authorized for an offense based solely on the facts reflected in 
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.
Enhanced sentence: a sentence longer than the effective 
maximum sentence.
Determinate sentencing system: a system in which there is 
no discretionary releasing authority and an offender may be 
released from prison only after expiration of the sentence 
imposed (less available good or earned time).  
Indeterminate sentencing system: a system in which a 
discretionary releasing authority, such as a parole board, may 
release an offender from prison prior to expiration of the 
sentence imposed. It may also, but need not, allow judges to 
impose a sentence range (such as, three-to-six years) rather 
than a specific period of time to be served.
Although Justice O’Connor may have understated 
the number of states affected by the Court’s ruling, 
the situation may not be as dire as her conclusion 
that “[o]ver 20 years of sentencing reform are all 
but lost.” It is true that affected states will have 
to amend their sentencing structures . . . But 
that reality is tempered by the fact that in many 
states, unlike the federal system, judicial fact-
finding is used in only a small fraction of cases.
structured sentencing systems. As Justice Scalia states for 
the Court, “we are not . . .  find[ing] determinate sentencing 
schemes unconstitutional. . . . Nothing we have said impugns 
[the] salutary objectives” of “proportionality to the gravity of 
the offense and parity among defendants” that prompted 
Washington’s guidelines system.7 
That having been said, states’ ability to limit judicial 
discretion to achieve these and other goals is now 
significantly constrained. It is perhaps ironic that the Court 
has found that the Sixth Amendment, with its jury guarantee 
as a bulwark against state power, actually limits attempts to 
reign in judicial authority through structured sentencing. On 
the one hand, it is hard to argue with the Court’s view of the 
centrality of both the right to be tried by a jury of one’s peers 
and the application of the highest standard of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt; indeed the dissenting justices do not 
make much of an effort. On the other hand, it is the Court’s 
insistence on drawing a “bright-line” formulation to protect 
these rights, one that establishes a firm constitutional line 
rather than allowing legislative and judicial flexibility, that is 
precipitating the present upheaval.8   
The Impact of Blakely on State Systems
At the end of the day, Blakely’s reach largely will be 
determined by courts in the states. They will determine the 
force and effect of their sentencing rules and whether certain 
provisions violate Blakely. And they will determine whether 
simply the offending provisions are affected or whether a 
state’s entire structured sentencing scheme is void. It is likely 
that results will differ state to state based on distinctions in 
sentencing structures, differing interpretations of the Court’s 
ruling, and the degree to which pragmatic concerns about 
systemic impact influence judgment. It will take a few years 
for the ultimate nature and scope of Blakely’s impact to be 
known, but this much we know for certain: its potential to 
reshape sentencing in the United States is profound, as we 
discuss below.
Presumptive sentencing guidelines systems 
It is evident that the four other states (not including Kansas, 
which is discussed below) with presumptive sentencing 
guidelines systems—Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, 
and Tennessee—will be affected by the decision to the same 
extent as Washington. In each of these states, guidelines 
establish a range for an offense that sets the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose based on the jury’s verdict. 
A judge may impose a sentence above the maximum in 
the range only when the judge makes a finding of aggravating 
factors. 
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Presumptive sentencing guidelines systems: 
fundamentally affected by Blakely
Minnesota
North Carolina
Oregon
Tennessee
Washington
Presumptive (non-guidelines) sentencing systems: 
fundamentally affected by Blakely
Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Indiana
New Jersey
New Mexico
Ohio
Voluntary sentencing systems: 
possibly affected by Blakely
Arkansas
Delaware
Maryland
Rhode Island
Utah
Virginia
Voluntary sentencing systems: not affected by Blakely 
District of Columbia
Louisiana
Missouri
Wisconsin
Presumptive sentencing guidelines in indeterminate 
systems: possibly affected by Blakely
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Washington, for its part, prescribes a presumed sentence 
range, the “standard range,” within the broader statutory 
sentence range for each offense. The judge must impose a 
definite term within this standard range, but on finding an 
“aggravating factor” the judge may impose an “exceptional 
sentence” beyond the standard range but lower than the 
statutory maximum. When an exceptional sentence is based 
on such an aggravating factor, the judge must articulate, for 
the record, facts to support that decision.9 The guidelines 
systems in Minnesota and Oregon are nearly identical in 
structure to Washington. Those in North Carolina and 
Tennessee are different, but not in ways relevant to the ruling 
in Blakely.  
Unlike other systems, North Carolina’s guidelines are 
“mandatory” in that they require a judge in every case to 
impose a sentence within the designated cell of a sentencing 
guidelines grid.10 Thus, judges in North Carolina cannot 
impose a sentence above those recommended within a 
guidelines cell, as judges can in Washington. However, the 
North Carolina guidelines set mitigated, presumptive, and 
aggravated ranges within each cell. The court must impose a 
sentence within the presumptive range unless the judge 
finds aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Only then may the judge impose a sentence within the 
aggravated range. In this sense, a sentence in the aggravated 
range in North Carolina is an enhanced sentence, equivalent 
to an “exceptional sentence” under the Washington guidelines. 
of facts by the judge—the very thing the Supreme Court ruled 
violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 
Kansas employs a presumptive sentencing guidelines 
system similar to Washington’s. However, Kansas’s system 
is not generally implicated by Blakely because it has amended 
its statutes to require that a jury find any fact that forms 
the basis of an enhanced sentence. Kansas acted in response 
to the only state court decision that struck down its 
guidelines system for the reasons ultimately determined by 
the Court in Blakely.12 As we discuss below, the Kansas model 
represents one solution to the problem in these 
states’ systems.13 
Presumptive (non-guidelines) 
sentencing systems 
At least eight states that do not formally employ guidelines—
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, and Ohio—nonetheless employ presumptive 
sentences and require judges to provide justification 
when they deviate from those sentences. Although these 
states’ systems lack the multiple ranges of sentencing 
guidelines systems, they are comprehensively structured 
and functionally equivalent to guidelines, at least for Sixth 
Amendment purposes. In all of these—often referred to 
as presumptive sentencing or determinate sentencing 
systems—statutes set a single presumptive sentence or range 
of sentences for each offense within the statutory range. The 
judge must impose that presumptive sentence or one within 
the presumptive range and may impose a higher term only 
after finding aggravating factors.  
 New Mexico is typical. In New Mexico, statutes set a 
single-term “basic sentence of imprisonment” for each 
offense. For a first degree felony, for example, the basic 
sentence is 18 years; for a second degree felony, it is nine 
years. The appropriate basic sentence must be imposed 
unless the court alters it based on aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances. When the judge finds any “aggravating 
circumstance” relevant to the offense or the defendant, the 
judge may impose a sentence up to one-third above the 
basic sentence.14 Thus, in New Mexico, the basic sentence, 
although a single term, acts as the effective maximum 
sentence a defendant may receive absent a judicial finding of 
an aggravating circumstance.  
 Alaska, Arizona, California, Indiana, New Jersey, and 
Ohio use different terminology for the “basic sentences” 
and “aggravating circumstances” they rely on, but to the 
same effect. In Ohio, for example, statutes require the court 
to impose the “shortest prison term authorized for the 
offense” unless the judge finds that the shortest prison term 
will “demean the seriousness” of the offender’s conduct 
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Blakely’s reach largely will be determined 
by courts in the states. They will 
determine whether certain provisions of 
a state’s sentencing rules violate Blakely.  
In Tennessee, on the other hand, guidelines establish 
sentence ranges with single-term “presumptive sentences” 
within those ranges. For the most serious class of felonies, 
the presumptive sentence is the midpoint in the guidelines 
range; for lesser felonies, the presumptive sentence is the 
minimum term in the guidelines range. The court must 
impose the presumptive sentence unless the judge states 
on the record a finding of an “enhancement factor.” In 
such instances the judge may impose a sentence up to the 
maximum in the guidelines range for the offense.11 Thus, 
Tennessee’s guidelines differ from those in Washington in 
that the presumptive sentence is a single term of years rather 
than a range of sentences. This single term is the effective 
maximum for an offense because a sentence above this term 
(even within the guidelines range) requires a finding of 
additional “enhancement factors.”
All of these states share the same fundamental problem: 
a jury’s verdict, or a defendant’s guilty plea, only authorizes a 
sentence to the presumptive maximum sentence or within the 
presumptive range. An enhanced sentence requires a finding 
or “not adequately protect the public;” in such cases the 
judge may impose any term up to the statutory maximum.15 
In California, statutes prescribe a “lower,” “middle,” and 
“upper” term for each offense and require a judge to 
impose the middle term absent a finding of “aggravating 
circumstances.”16 In Colorado, on the other hand, statutes 
set a fairly wide “presumptive range” for each offense class 
and require the court to impose a definite sentence within 
the presumptive range unless it concludes that “extraordinary 
aggravating circumstances” are present and support a 
different sentence that “better serves the purposes” of the 
criminal code. If the judge finds such circumstances, the 
judge may impose a sentence up to twice the maximum 
authorized in the presumptive range for the offense.17  
As with the presumptive guidelines jurisdictions, these 
states share the common problem that a jury verdict, or guilty 
plea, only authorizes a sentence to the presumptive term or 
within the presumptive range. Any enhanced sentence relies 
on judicial fact-finding in violation of the Blakely rule.
Voluntary sentencing systems  
In contrast with states that use presumptive sentencing 
systems, with or without guidelines, 10 jurisdictions employ 
voluntary guidelines systems. These systems are similar in 
structure to the Washington guidelines in that they prescribe 
a range of sentences for each offense or offense class, but 
they differ in that the ranges are expressly not binding. 
Because there is considerable variety in the structure of these 
systems and differences in how legislatures instruct judges to 
employ the guidelines, some states may be at greater risk to 
Blakely challenge than others. These 10 jurisdictions fall into 
two basic groups. 
In four of these systems—those of the District of 
Columbia, Louisiana, Missouri, and Wisconsin—judges are 
encouraged to consider guidelines ranges in determining 
appropriate sentences, but no additional fact-finding is 
required of a judge to impose a sentence outside the range 
and up to the statutory maximum. Nor is there a requirement 
that judges provide reasons for doing so. In these four 
jurisdictions, the effective maximum sentence—that which is 
authorized by the jury verdict or a defendant’s guilty plea—is 
the statutory maximum in all cases; thus they do not seem to 
conflict with Blakely.
 The other six voluntary guidelines states—Arkansas, 
Delaware, Maryland, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia—may, 
however, run afoul of Blakely. They require judges first to 
apply the guidelines ranges but then allow them to depart 
upward—provided they state their reasons for doing so. In 
Arkansas, for example, “the presumptive sentence” in all 
cases is determined according to sentencing guidelines; for 
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the judge to impose a sentence that varies more than five 
percent from the presumptive sentence, written justification 
“specifying the reasons for such departure” must be given.18 
Similarly, in Virginia the judge must “review and consider” 
the suitability of the applicable “discretionary” sentencing 
guidelines. Before imposing sentence, the judge “shall state 
for the record” that such review and consideration have been 
accomplished. If the judge imposes a sentence greater than 
that indicated by the guidelines, the judge must file a “written 
explanation of such departure.”19 
The requirement in each jurisdiction that a judge first 
apply the sentences articulated in the guidelines and then 
provide reasons for a decision not to follow them may 
bring them within the Blakely rule. Put another way, the 
requirement that a judge state reasons as a pre-condition of 
an enhanced sentence may establish the top of the guidelines 
range as the effective maximum sentence—a situation no 
different from the one presented in Blakely. Whether this is 
so will have to be determined first by the courts through their 
interpretations of the practical effect of the state’s specific 
statutory or administrative language. If a court holds that 
the practical effect of a state’s system is that a judge cannot 
deliver an enhanced sentence absent the finding and stating 
of reasons beyond those found by a jury or admitted by a 
defendant, these systems may fall.20 
Such a result is far from certain for the following reasons. 
One could argue that the advisory character of the systems 
in these five states would spare them Blakely problems; 
judges are expressly not required to follow the guidelines 
recommendations. A court could hold, therefore, that the 
requirement that judges apply the guidelines and provide 
reasons for departing does not in fact constrain a judge’s 
discretion but serves solely as an information-recording 
function. Or it could determine that the requirement that 
reasons be provided is so flexible—allowing a statement to 
the effect of “the guidelines range is not adequate for this 
offense”—that the jury verdict or plea alone authorizes a 
sentence up to the statutory maximum. In such instances, 
these states may indeed be immune to Blakely. That said, 
there is adequate reason for caution.21 The Court made clear 
that the practical effects of sentencing rules determine the 
scope of the right to trial by jury, whether a system is called 
voluntary or not.22
Presumptive sentencing guidelines 
in indeterminate systems  
Two states—Michigan and Pennsylvania—are in a somewhat 
different situation and it is less clear whether Blakely will 
affect them. Indeed, it is possible to construct equally 
compelling arguments that Blakely does or does not apply. 
The arguments turn on competing definitions of the effective 
maximum sentence in such indeterminate states. 
Michigan and Pennsylvania employ indeterminate 
sentencing schemes with presumptive guidelines.23 In 
both states, judges set a minimum and maximum term to 
each sentence, but limits are imposed only on the setting 
of the minimum term. The maximum term may be set in 
all instances up to the statutory maximum. The minimum 
term determines a defendant’s parole eligibility date, or the 
period a defendant must serve in prison; the maximum 
term controls a defendant’s mandatory release date, or the 
maximum period a defendant will serve if not released by a 
parole board. Thus, in each state, the judge determines how 
long an offender must serve in prison before being eligible 
for parole release. The sentencing guidelines in these states 
establish a range of minimum terms. A judge may impose a 
minimum term above the guidelines range only by finding 
aggravating factors on the record. 
The Court has previously held that the Sixth Amendment is 
not violated by a system that requires an enhanced minimum 
sentence based upon judicial findings of fact. Yet that ruling 
applies only so long as the enhanced minimum sentence is 
not beyond that “authorized by the jury’s verdict.”24 
On the one hand, therefore, it may be argued that a 
sentence with an enhanced minimum term in Michigan and 
Pennsylvania effectively exceeds that authorized by the jury 
verdict because a defendant who receives such a sentence 
likely will remain incarcerated longer than one who receives a 
sentence with a minimum term within the guidelines range. 
To the extent that an enhanced minimum term—that is, one 
beyond the guidelines range—leads to a longer period of 
incarceration by extending the date at which the defendant 
is eligible to be released, these systems may be held to 
violate Blakely. 
On the other hand, it is also possible to characterize the 
maximum sentence authorized by the jury verdict as being 
controlled solely by the maximum term in an indeterminate 
system, and there is no limit on the maximum term a judge 
may set in these two states up to the statutory maximum. 
Moreover, because of the discretion vested in the parole 
board—the hallmark of indeterminate sentencing—some 
who are given non-enhanced minimum terms may remain 
incarcerated longer than those sentenced to enhanced 
minimum terms; the minimum term only commences 
parole eligibility but does not require that a defendant be 
released on that date. Thus, to the extent it is determined that 
the effective maximum sentence is the statutory maximum 
or that the mere likelihood of an increased period of 
incarceration is not sufficient to trigger the jury right, these 
systems will be upheld. 
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Part of the difficulty in assessing the effect of Blakely is 
that it addressed a determinate sentencing structure—one 
without parole or other discretionary release—in which the 
sentence is expressed as a single term that fully determines 
when a defendant will be released. No decision in the 
Apprendi25 line has explicitly addressed the effect of these 
rulings on indeterminate sentencing structures such as in 
Michigan and Pennsylvania.26 Future rulings will be required 
to settle how, or if, Blakely applies to these states.27
There is, finally, one other group of states that this 
decision affects. A number of jurisdictions (some of which 
have already been discussed as implicated by Blakely) are 
currently revising their sentencing systems or criminal 
codes, or studying the need to do so. They include Alabama, 
Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Blakely’s ultimate effects 
should significantly influence the manner in which they 
pursue reforms.
Reconciling State Sentencing 
Systems with Blakely
The dissenting opinions in the Blakely case were short on 
constitutional argument and long on discussion of the dire 
practical considerations for state sentencing systems. This 
is not surprising; the constitutional issue had been largely 
decided in the Court’s prior rulings, and the implications 
for many states, as well as the federal system, are indeed 
enormous. But will they be as dire as predicted?  
Before venturing an answer, it is important to note that, 
constitutional jurisprudence aside, the Blakely decision 
allows for some seemingly perverse effects. For example, in 
a sentencing system that fully relies on statutory minimum 
and maximum sentences, judges have the fact-finding 
authority necessary to determine the appropriate sentence 
anywhere within the statutory range up to the maximum in 
any given case.28 In such a system a judge may be authorized 
to make a fact-finding of deliberate cruelty, for example, and 
sentence a defendant to three years more incarceration than 
the judge might have otherwise. Yet a state is no longer free 
to do precisely that if it imposes limits on judicial sentencing 
discretion, as Washington did by enacting guidelines 
that regulate maximum sentences short of the statutory 
maximum. Thus the states may achieve in one context what 
the Court says the Constitution prohibits in another. It is 
perhaps perverse that the scope of the right to trial by jury 
turns on such a distinction. 
Such effects notwithstanding, the Court’s ruling does 
not require states to abandon their guidelines systems—
although it certainly limits a state’s avenues to channel 
judicial discretion. States that have chosen to rein in judicial 
discretion through the presumptive or voluntary systems 
affected by Blakely still have an option that retains the core 
of their systems and complies with the ruling. Those states 
can allocate fact-finding to juries when enhanced sentences 
are sought. States that seek to maintain a maximum of 
judicial sentencing authority while providing persuasive, 
although non-binding, guidance may seek to make their 
voluntary systems fully voluntary—like those in the District 
of Columbia, Louisiana, Missouri, and Wisconsin—if the 
courts hold that they currently are not so. And the imperative 
of revisiting current systems also may provide an opportunity 
for some states to move from a presumptive system to a 
voluntary one, or vice versa. The decision each state makes 
likely will turn on the goals it sought to achieve by enacting 
guidelines, the degree to which those goals remain vital, 
and the combustible political forces that exert themselves 
whenever criminal justice is the subject of reform.
The feasibility of jury fact-finding  
After the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the state’s 
guidelines system in 2001 (presaging Blakely), the legislature 
chose to retain presumptive guidelines by incorporating 
jury fact-finding as the basis of an enhanced sentence.29 
Kansas’s choice and its subsequent experience thus provide 
some guidance for states that must alter their systems. 
Under the revised system, if Kansas prosecutors decide 
to seek an enhanced sentence, they must file a motion 30 
days before trial. The judge then decides whether, in the 
interests of justice, the evidence of enhancing factors must 
be presented at a post-trial sentencing hearing rather than 
at the trial.30 Only evidence that has been disclosed to the 
defense is admissible in an enhancement determination; if 
the defendant testifies at such a hearing it is not admissible 
in any subsequent criminal proceeding. The jury must be 
unanimous that a factor has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If the jury finds such a factor, the judge nonetheless 
retains the discretion to sentence within or beyond the 
guidelines range.
Neither prosecutors nor the defense bar have raised strong 
concerns about the justice or efficiency of this procedure. The 
Kansas Appellate Defender Office amicus brief in Blakely, 
arguing against the constitutionality of presumptive systems 
such as Washington’s and Kansas’s former system, provides 
implicit support for the state’s legislative response. Interviews 
with defenders in the state indicate that the defense bar 
generally finds the procedure unobjectionable with one 
exception: the possibility that prejudicial “sentencing factors” 
might be presented during the trial (which appears not to 
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Managing a Response to Blakely
Kansas shows that states can create effective and well-
informed processes to respond to Blakely. Following 
the Supreme Court’s 2000 Apprendi ruling, Kansas 
officials were concerned about the constitutionality of 
their presumptive guidelines system. Even before the 
state’s high court later validated that concern, the Kansas 
Sentencing Commission created a subcommittee to 
study the applicability of the ruling and to consider policy 
responses. Importantly, the subcommittee included 
legislators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. 
The participation of all four of these groups was essential 
to the creation of a legislative response that was not only 
substantively workable and fair but politically acceptable.
As the group came to understand the Court’s decision 
and to consider which legislative options were most 
appropriate, subcommittee members kept the following 
key questions in mind, according to Barbara Tombs, then 
executive director of the Commission:
• First, what are the underlying goals of sentencing 
guidelines? Are principles of fairness, public safety, 
and resource control served by a possible solution?
• Second, how are the burdens of a possible solution 
distributed? Does either the defense or prosecution 
enjoy an unfair advantage or suffer an undue burden 
as a result? Are these factors in balance?
• Third, how does a solution affect judicial discretion 
and resources? Does a solution fit within understood 
or articulated powers granted to the court? And is 
it a solution that a court can apply with its existing 
capacity?
Thoughtful deliberations guided by these questions and 
participation by necessary institutional actors from both 
sides of the adversarial system and all three branches of 
government led to the creation of a legislative response 
that was quickly embraced and has proven to be effective 
in practice.
have occurred to date). Interviews with prosecutors and 
judges in the state also indicate that the procedure does not 
place significant extra burdens on the system. It has been 
used infrequently, but not because it is unworkable. Indeed, 
it had always been rare for judges to sentence defendants to 
enhanced sentences after trial, largely because in a plea-
driven system the available sentences after trial are already 
effectively “enhanced.”31 
It is perhaps not surprising that jury fact-finding has 
proved feasible in Kansas. It is common in parts of other 
states’ systems. Although not a structured sentencing state, 
Illinois previously authorized extended sentences based on 
judicially-determined facts. Following the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Apprendi, Illinois changed its enhancement statute 
to require that an aggravating factor be included in the 
charging document and that it be proved to the jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt.32 Although California employs a general 
presumptive system in which judges make fact findings 
necessary to depart from presumptive sentences, implicating 
Blakely, in other circumstances it requires that aggravating 
factors—such as possession of a weapon in the course of an 
enumerated offense—be put to a jury.33 
It also has to be kept in mind that concerns voiced by 
a number of commentators regarding the workability of 
lead to “significant administrative difficulties,” as the federal 
government’s Blakely brief puts it.36 First, in systems that use 
a large number of judicially-determined factors in arriving at 
the initial presumptive range—such as the federal system—
jury fact-finding would have to be employed in virtually every 
sentencing, not just those in which an enhanced sentence 
was sought. It appears, however, that no state system relies 
on factors that determine the presumptive range to a degree 
comparable to the federal system.37 Second, in states that 
require prosecution by grand jury indictment there may be 
the significant additional burden of presenting “sentencing 
factors” for grand jury consideration at the outset of virtually 
every felony case to enable their later presentation to the 
trial jury.38 
Fully voluntary guidelines
Some states, particularly those with voluntary systems that 
are deemed to be affected by Blakely, may choose not to 
follow Kansas’s example of requiring juries to make such fact 
findings. Rather they may choose to eliminate their effective 
sentencing thresholds and adopt fully voluntary sentencing 
systems. Here, too, there are examples from which states may 
draw lessons. The District of Columbia, Louisiana, Missouri, 
and Wisconsin have enacted such fully voluntary systems. 
Presumably they did so to achieve a proper balance between 
judicial discretion and legislative or administrative control 
so that sentences are geographically and racially neutral and 
appropriate to the offense. 
To make their systems fully voluntary, these states might 
eliminate the requirement that judges provide reasons as 
a prerequisite to an enhanced sentence. Such a change is 
not, of course, without consequences and again suggests 
an apparently perverse result of the Blakely ruling. The 
requirement that judges provide reasons for departures 
would seem to be based on a state’s determination of the 
value of publicly stating those reasons. Few would disagree 
that there is inherent value in requiring government actors 
to explain publicly decisions that have important individual 
and societal effects. And a state seeking to understand the 
causes of racial or geographic disparities in sentencing, for 
example, might examine the reasons stated in cases where 
members of different groups are given enhanced sentences. 
Moreover, although there is generally no right to appeal 
a sentence simply because it falls beyond the voluntary 
guidelines, appellate courts might in the future perform a 
rudimentary reasonableness review of all sentences, and this 
review would rely on sentencing judges’ statements of their 
reasons. A regime that discourages the stating of reasons may 
adversely affect such appellate review of the reasonableness of 
sentencing decisions.
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The hope is that Blakely provides as much an 
opportunity as it does a challenge and that 
legislators will develop different and better 
approaches ... 
jury fact-finding have a limited reach. The vast majority of 
criminal cases, perhaps as high as 95 percent, do not result 
in trials,34 and it appears that most guidelines states use 
enhanced sentences in only between two percent and nine 
percent of all cases.35 As with Kansas, Blakely affects only a 
small subset of trial cases that result in enhanced sentences, 
and trial cases themselves are only a small subset of all felony 
cases. Of course, the Blakely ruling may very well have some 
tangential effect on cases that result in pleas. The bargaining 
powers of prosecution and defense may shift, although it is 
far from clear in what direction, and the reports from Kansas 
are inconclusive in this regard. To the extent that the number 
of trials in the criminal justice system has diminished, the 
consequences of requiring juries to determine sentencing 
factors for enhanced sentences are relatively modest. 
On the other hand, there are two ways—not present in 
Kansas—in which jury fact-finding of aggravating factors may 
Questions to consider.  
In deciding how to fashion a cure to a state’s Blakely ills, 
there are a number of questions each state may wish to 
consider to ensure that the cure is not worse than the 
disease. A state may consider the following in light of 
the goals that underlie its decision to enact structured 
sentencing:
• How will a chosen system affect the balance of power 
between the defense and the prosecution, especially in 
regard to its effects on the system of plea bargaining? 
• How will it affect the ability of judges to incorporate 
sentencing factors relevant to the specific 
circumstances of the offense and specific history and 
circumstances of the defendant?
• How will it affect racial and other demographic 
disparities in sentencing?
• How will it affect geographic disparities; will like cases 
be treated more alike or less alike in different parts of 
the state?
• How will it affect average sentence lengths and, thus, 
prison populations?
• What effects will it have on the predictability of 
sentences for purposes of determining institutional 
resources, such as probation and corrections staff 
and facilities?
Voluntary states affected by Blakely have another option, 
however, for achieving fully voluntary systems. They can 
retain the general requirement that judges provide reasons 
for their sentencing decisions but make explicit that judges 
need only consider, but need not apply, the guidelines in 
any given case. Although this distinction may seem to split 
hairs, the Supreme Court’s bright-line rule requires that 
hairs be split somewhere, and this seems a likely place. In 
this way the value of judicially stated reasons is preserved, 
but because application of the guidelines is truly voluntary 
the effective maximum sentence in each case is the statutory 
maximum and no Blakely problem arises. The nation’s most 
recently implemented sentencing guidelines system—in 
the District of Columbia—has taken this approach. 
The District expressly allows for sentencing outside the 
guidelines box based upon a “decision by a judge not to use 
the sentencing guidelines.”39 It was a conscious decision 
of the District’s sentencing commission to provide judges 
with the information that advisory guidelines offer but to 
allow judges to continue to sentence according to their own 
processes. The system also preserves the benefits of judicially 
stated sentencing reasons—it requires stated reasons in all 
cases, whether judges apply the guidelines or not—and the 
commission hopes to use information both from judges who 
use the guidelines and those who do not in fashioning future 
changes to the system. 
Other possible options
Justice Breyer, in his Blakely dissent, mentions other 
possible options for states. One is an outright bar on judicial 
discretion through what he calls “determinate sentencing”: 
mandatory terms or ranges of terms from which a judge may 
not depart. There is one state example of this approach in 
the non-guidelines context. Iowa uses a mandatory system 
in which judges are bound to impose the sole statutory term 
of years for most felony offenses and the parole board has 
discretion to determine how long the defendant ultimately 
will serve. But, in the guidelines context, it appears that no 
state uses a system that is fully mandatory. Other than Iowa, 
the states shy away from such extreme limits on judicial 
sentencing discretion. 
Another of Justice Breyer’s options is a retreat from 
guidelines altogether, to the indeterminate sentencing 
regimes used in roughly half the states. But given the caution 
and discernable lack of appetite to abolish guidelines systems 
that many state officials have shown in the weeks since 
Blakely, there is little reason to suspect that states will jettison 
their guidelines altogether rather than apply one of the 
modifications mentioned above.
Justice Breyer suggests, too, that there may be more 
threatening responses to Blakely, such as a top-down system 
in which the presumptive sentence for each offense would be 
the maximum sentence authorized by statute. A sentencing 
judge might then depart downward only after finding 
mitigating facts. Yet, there is no reason to believe this option 
will prove attractive to state policymakers as it would be costly 
and might lead to harsh, perhaps unpredictable, sentences. 
More realistic may be an option that Florida has chosen, in 
which a judge’s ability to sentence at the top of the statutory 
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range is not constrained. Yet, those states that enacted 
guidelines to control sentences deemed excessive may not 
be satisfied with such an approach. For such states the cost 
of jury fact-finding, as in Kansas, may be in line with the 
benefits of maintaining presumptive sentence ranges.
• • • • • •
The Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely is not surprising 
from a legal standpoint in that it did not stray far from 
prior decisions. But it is truly extraordinary when viewed 
in the context of its near and far term implications for state 
sentencing systems. We have attempted one view of those 
likely implications, but this story is only beginning to play 
out. How courts will interpret different systems in light of 
Blakely is largely unknown and will guide legislatures in 
crafting new systems that preserve a reinvigorated right 
to trial by jury while also preserving to the greatest extent 
possible the goals of their structured sentencing systems. 
The hope is that Blakely provides as much an opportunity as 
it does a challenge and that legislators will develop different 
and better approaches than those we have mentioned. 
To place in context the burdens state legislatures now 
face, Justice Scalia’s closing words regarding Mr. Blakely’s 
enhanced sentence serve as a useful reminder of what is 
at stake: 
The Framers would not have thought it too much 
to demand that, before depriving a man of three 
more years of his liberty, the State should suffer 
the modest inconvenience of submitting its 
accusation to the unanimous suffrage of twelve 
of his equals and neighbours, rather than a lone 
employee of the State.40
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